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Abstract. It has been a long time since the concept of iconic signs was proposed 
by C. S. Peirce. From that time on, we have been increasingly realizing that 
semiotic systems are for the most part established just on some type of similarity. 
But the more we see the sphere of analogical signification expanding its realm, the 
more we become aware of how inadequate is the notion of a simple relationship 
connecting locally a physical object with a second object, or with a mental entity. 
There is, on the other hand, the more refined theory of sign conceived by 
Ferdinand de Saussure, but this theory, by its very definition, addresses a 
restricted domain, and definitely does not include the field of those signs which 
rest on analogical associations. 
The main purpose of this article is then to show how the more polished 
Saussurean model can act as a starting point for a general restatement, primarily 
intended to embrace the signs that rest on an analogical basis. We may so speak of 
a “neoclassical”, innovative semiotic theory, able to join the latest “sociosemiotic” 
approach with the most precious foundations of our discipline. 
 
 
A different view on semiotic analogies 
 
There is no doubt that semiotics has suffered a lot due to so many 
ambiguities about concepts such as “analogy”, “similarity” or “resemb-
Guido Ferraro  68
lance”. Primarily, as we shall see in the next pages, we have to face 
unsatisfactory theoretical models concerning the semiotic correlations 
which rest on an analogical basis: more or less what traditional Peircean 
terminology calls “icons”. More generally, it seems unacceptable that, 
after a century from the establishment of the discipline, we still cannot 
refer to a unified theory about the most fundamental semiotic relations. 
Referring to an idea of semiotics fully conceived as a social science 
(a “sociosemiotics”, according to the term nowadays largely used, 
mainly in Italy and in France), I think that we have to refer more 
closely to the perspective originating from Durkheim and Saussure. In 
the first instance, we can rethink the original Saussurean model in new 
terms, more consistent with the ways of seeing that we feel distinctive 
of social sciences. I am referring here to the perspective of a social 
foundation of semiotic systems, as in the Saussurean definition of “se-
miology”, or to the idea of a constitutive role of languages and 
symbolic systems in the very establishment of a social structure, as in 
the thought of Émile Durkheim.1 
The main purpose of this article is to show how the more polished 
model by Ferdinand de Saussure, usually restricted to the linguistic 
field, can instead act as a starting point for a general restatement, 
primarily intended to embrace the signs which rest on an analogical 
basis. I can only mention here what we owe to scholars such as Claude 
Lévi-Strauss or Luis Prieto, who both reworked some facets of the 
Saussurean thought, in a perspective more consonant with the vision 
of a social science.2 
First of all, we have to remark that any possible way of defining 
correlations of signs involving “analogies” runs into the multiplicity of 
                                                 
1  See mainly his seminal work on symbolism, where languages play an essential 
part in a sociological reworking of the Kantian model (Durkheim 1912). 
2  For an in-depth discussion of the sign model in Lévi-Strauss, see Ferraro 2001; 
a shortest exposition can be found at www.etnosemiotica.it/programma_giornata_ 
levi_strauss_guido_ferraro_levi-strauss_un_maestro_per_una_strada_ancora_da_ 
percorrere_contributo.php. For Prieto’s model, see Prieto 1975. 
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different operations, different functions, different semiotic ranks that 
analogies may assume. On the other hand, there is no doubt that 
semiotics, from its very beginning, focused on the problematic crux 
concerning the interrelated concepts of identity, difference, and 
analogy. It is revealing to note how Saussure stressed the absolute 
centrality of analogical mechanism in language: central with regard to 
diachronical modifications, ways of learning our own tongue, and to 
morphological structuring, too. As he said, “every language at any 
time is nothing else but a whole of analogical patterns” (Saussure 2002: 
161). On the other hand, when he speaks about signs’ identity, he 
disassembles the apparent level of analogies — “positive” relations, 
seemingly recognizable in the “things” themselves — pulverizing them 
in a mere illusionistic effect of what are the actual constitutive bricks 
of language: negative and differential relations. Well known is the case 
of the many possible ways of tracing the letter “t” in the Roman 
alphabet: if we have become used to saying that those graphic traces, 
even if objectively dissimilar, are effectively equivalent, this is not on 
account of what makes them positively similar, but on account of the 
differences they share, with regard to other units belonging to the 
same system. 
Keeping up a tradition starting from Saussure and later deepened, 
among others, by Luis Prieto (1975), we must therefore think that the 
different ways of manifesting a signifier are not equivalent because 
they are inherently similar, but that on the contrary they look similar 
because we assign them the same distinctive features, and accordingly 
we regard them as equivalent and interchangeable. From the point of 
view of a speaker, the effect of analogy is so immediately evident as to 
determine precisely the naive impression that the likeness is “in the 
things themselves”, and that the likeness could be the source, not the 
effect, of an assignment of identity. The analogies we perceive are 
actually the result of the work of semiotic systems: consequently, there 
cannot be any semiotic system “founded” on analogies, but systems that 
build and work out analogies in different ways. 
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As we know, what applies to the signifier, applies to the signified in 
the same way. As the word “blue”, uttered by different voices, pro-
duces sounds objectively different — but we always subjectively 
recognize “the same word” — so the chromatic representations 
coming under the category of “blue” are definitely different, but we 
feel them as “similar” — when objectively they are not. Of course, as 
we all are familiar with the experience of at least one second tongue, 
we know that people speaking different tongues have partly different 
perceptions about what is “similar” and what is “different”, just be-
cause such an effect of similarity is created by the system. 
In our straight relation with the surrounding world, we are always 
dealing with differences between things. There never was an inge-
nuous time when we naïvely lived in a world of magical analogies, as 
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1910) could suppose, nor is it a matter of a specific 
“postmodern” inability to recognize analogies, as in the perspective of 
Barbara Maria Stafford.3 The focal point is, for us, that a system of 
signs — every system of signs, of any kind! — cannot work if not 
producing effects of similarity, starting from what actually is a network 
of differences. Usually, we do not underline enough the primary fact 
that any semiotic system — even if it has nothing to do with 
“iconism” — relies on a mechanism in some respects based on 
analogies: a consideration which partly explains the numerous 
confusions and perplexities in the theoretical treatment of the concept 
of “analogy”. In effect, as every system of signs rests on correlations 
between classes (on both sides of signifier and signified), and the 
common belonging to a class creates such a strong effect of “simila-
rity”, it follows that in all systems of signs the upshot of similarity 
always plays a leading role. 
In order to distinguish this type of similarity from other, different 
types, I propose to employ the expression “equi-similarity”. So, “equi-
                                                 
3  “Today, however, we possess no language for talking about resemblance, only 
an exaggerated awareness of difference” (Stafford 1999: 10). 
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similar” are those entities that are perceived as analogous because they 
are semiotically equivalent, as possible ways of realizing the same 
signifier (as in the case of the many different ways of writing the letter 
“t”), or the same signified (as in the case of the many chromatic 
representations that belong to the signified of the term “blue”). 
The core of the “classic” semiotic view could then be stated as follows: 
signifier and signified should be conceived of as categorical structures set 
at a high level in the cognitive hierarchy. Operating into discursive 
practices, they generate working sets that are respectively sets of expres-
sive variants (for the signifiers) and sets of senses (for the signifieds). The 
expressive variants manifest themselves in perceptible objects (sounds, 
colors, static or moving shapes, and so on), while on the other hand the 
specific senses find a definite correspondence in psychological entities 
(mental representations, emotional conditions, and so on). 
This “classical” theoretical model is not only stylish and refined but 
also operationally effective, and attentive to the functional dimensions 
of signs. Moreover, it is capable of linking very well the relational 
dynamics operating at the systemic level with the psychological reality 
that signs take in the mind of speaking people. For these reasons, it 
should be definitely preferred to the reworking carried out by Louis 
Hjelmslev, that is too abstract and unrealistic from the very beginning, 
and later overwhelmed by too many inconsistent exploitations.4 The 
main problem is that, in its original view, the “classical” model was 
conceived exclusively for the arbitrary signs, a case unquestionably 
very relevant but also quite atypical. The idea on which this article is 
founded is that there are no actual reasons to exclude the validity of 
                                                 
4  See the critical attitude taken by Luis Prieto (1975), and more recently by Fran-
çois Rastier (2001: 58, ff). Concerning inconsistent exploitations, everyone could cite 
some examples, but I could start remembering a classical review by Cesare Segre, 
evaluating the many different and “hazardous” suggestions around what could 
match the Hjelmslevian quadripartion in the domain of literature (chapter on Text 
in Segre 1985). 
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this model in any other semiotic field, in the framework of what I call 
a neoclassical perspective. 
 
 
Equi-similarity in the world of indices 
 
A good starting point for such an extension can be thinking how this 
model could be adapted for those signs that the Peircean tradition calls 
“indices”. We know that a certain aura of oversimplification in the 
more popular definitions of those concepts are due to successive 
trivializations, but it is undeniable that their source is in the actual 
writings of the author. If we take into account the effective way we 
read indices in our surrounding reality, we can notice how we rely on 
our very essential habit of moving inside chains of events; but, if we 
examine the matter carefully, it is not a question of single events: we 
are building on settled patterns of events, structures set at a higher 
level (scripts, if you want). 
As in the perception of our experience of life, according to models 
that we learn to apply in our very first months of life, events are linked 
together in a sequence, this allows us to go back logically, passing from 
a link in the chain to another: something roughly similar to what in 
semiotics is called a “syntagmatic chain”. The form of the chain allows 
to both go upstream, from the effect to the cause (common examples 
are: from the footprint in the snow to the passing of the bear, or from 
the smoke to the fire, etc.), or to go downstream, from the cause to the 
effect (from the black clouds to the likelihood of rain). This is valid for 
“natural” signs, as well as for human indexical behavior: if a lady wears 
very expensive clothes, this is the result of available money (upstream 
connection), while if it happens that our interlocutor is insistently 
looking at his watch, a downstream connection allows us to read his 
behavior as expressing a concern for a flow of time which leads him 
towards a subsequent occurrence. 
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A typical pitfall is to think that the link between the index and its 
value sits at a local level. But what is happening in our mind when we 
see a black cloud in the sky, or a footprint in the snow, or a person 
who is insistently looking at his watch, is very much alike to what 
happens when we hear a word uttered. We do not operate a link 
between the perceived object and its meaning, but between the object 
we are perceiving and the class it belongs to. Physically, what I am 
seeing is a black cloud, or a person looking at his watch, but my 
interpretation of the specific perceived object or event arises because I 
recognize it as a particular occurrence of a general model: what carries 
for me the significance of “likelihood of rain” is not that specific black 
cloud which is now here in the sky (it is not a sign, then!), but the 
general class of black clouds which is stored in my mind. This is 
definitely far from the common version of the Peircean theory, where 
an index is something that has a real, physical connection with an 
object. “The index has no generality in itself. It does not depend on a 
mental association” (WP 5: 379). But in the same article Peirce 
suggests that index can also be seen as a token of a general connection, 
as it happens when I know that it is raining because I notice a number 
of people with their umbrellas up (the open umbrella asserts rain by 
virtue of a “mental association”, ibid.). So we are probably not too far 
from other, brighter aspects of Peircean thought, when we propose 
that an index works in conformity with the “classical” model; its 
signifier is not a single object at a local level (a cloud, for instance), but 
a model — in Saussurean terms, the “mental image” — which brings 
together all the possible, equi-similar black clouds: a mental entity of 
general value, of which the cloud I am seeing now is nothing but a 
local manifestation. All the possibilities of rain are “similar”, as all the 
black clouds are “similar”: the indexical relations cannot be grasped 
leaving aside the form of likeness that I call “equi-similarity”. 
The triangulation objectual representamen  interpretant  object 
can therefore be usefully replaced with the more unequivocal and 
better developed quadripartite structure: physical or textual immediate 
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entity signifier (general class)  signified (general class)  specific 
mental content (it should be stressed that there is no acceptable 
correspondence here between Peircean and Saussurean categories). 
This model, as well as being more explanatory, matches better the 
psychological truth of what is actually happening in my mind when, in 
the above-mentioned case, I see a black cloud: the semiotic func-
tioning of our mind follows correlations between classes, not between 
single objects. 
Now, we have to wonder if something like that can be true also for 
iconic correlations, that is, for semiotic correlations based on the es-
tablishment of an analogical link — here again in conflict with the 
Peircean principle denying generality to icons. However, we have to 
preliminarily remark that we are facing a huge and variegated universe. 
In fact, apart from language and its derived semiotic systems 
(primarily the alphabetical writing), almost all our expressive tools rest 
on an analogical ground. First of all, we have to go beyond the idea of 
a coincidence between analogical signification and visual expression. I 
agree with what Göran Sonesson (1994: 74) wrote: “in Peirce’s view, 
there is nothing intrinsically visual about iconicity”. So, we can see an 
analogical way of working in systems not strictly nor exclusively visual, 
like theatre, cinema and television, but also in systems that have 
nothing to do with the visual, like poetry, music, or the field — in its 
own right huge and diversified — of narrative production. Even 
though here we’ll stick to visual instances, and more specifically to 
photographic or cinematographic images, we’ll do so with the 
awareness of the extent and multiplicity of all that belongs to forms of 
semiosis based on analogical correlations. 
 
 
A light in the dark 
 
According to what I consider the brighter view of Peircean thought, 
the sign reference exists only in the mind of an interpreter, a “some-
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body” (“A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to some-
body […]” CP 2.22), whether we assume “somebody” as an individual 
or as a social entity (“we know that man is no whole as long as he is 
single, that he is essentially a possible member of society. […] It is not 
“my” experience, but “our” experience that has to be thought of; and 
this “us” has indefinite possibilities”, CP 5.402). Commenting on this 
passage, Peter Skagested (2004: 245) maintains that “communication, 
to Peirce, is the context in which thoughts are formed, and is logically 
prior to thinking processes taking place in individual minds”: a 
perspective which indeed shows remarkable affinities with the views 
both of Durkheim and of today’s sociosemiotics. In any case, the icon 
may be regarded as resting on a subjective judgment of resemblance; 
the resemblance is not in the things themselves but in the way a 
person, or a community, chooses to look at things. This basic 
assumption immediately underlines how any recognition of analogies 
implies an actual process of interpretation. But this conception is also 
capable of saving us from the common idea that analogy could link a 
thing to another thing, making it easier to adopt the view that, also in 
the case of icons, the semiotic structure links two abstract and general 
mental configurations, the signifier and the signified. 
Of course, some common examples, as those of photos made for 
identity cards or documentary images, present us with cases where there 
is no doubt that an image refers to a specific object in the world. This is 
an interesting and yet particular use, which assimilates the iconic signs 
to what in the language are the “proper nouns”, designators of 
individual entities. But in most cases the ways we employ images are 
more complex, and in the semiotic real life the analogical configurations 
are conceived with expressive and interpretative aims, well beyond the 
aim of simply pointing to something there in the world. 
It is not my aim here to discuss in detail the Peircean views about 
iconism, but I think they are too prone to a sort of “referential 
illusion”, speaking in Greimas’ terms. I remember here the classic 
example by Nelson Goodman (1968: 50): “Before me is a picture of 
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trees and cliffs by the sea, painted in dull grays, and expressing great 
sadness”. This picture “represents” things, but “expresses” certain 
feelings. According to Goodman, “a picture must stand for, symbolize, 
refer to, what it expresses” (Goodman 1968: 52). Although he does not 
embrace a fully semiotic view here, his idea about the meaning of a 
visual text is clearly of a metaphorical and emotional kind. Even more 
meaningful, Goodman claims that “representing is a matter of 
classifying objects rather than of imitating them, of characterizing 
rather than of copying, it is not a matter of passive reporting” (ibid, 
31).  
At this point, I think that we need an example, in order to better 
elucidate our matter. I choose a case quite subtle and refined, at first 
simple and evident but capable of showing how a sociosemiotic, 
systemic analysis can diverge from a textual inquiry, confined to a 
supposed local level. I will refer to the incipit of a film which manifests 
a special relevance from a semiotic point of view. The Sixth Sense, 
directed by M. Night Shyamalan in 1999, can be seen as a text about 
the ways we read our experience; moreover, anybody who saw it 
knows how the film plays with the reactions and the faults of its 
spectators, and with the slight boundary between what we see and 
what we know. The film incipit belongs to this subtle and meaningful 
game. Although almost nobody pays attention to it, at least when 
watching for the first time, the very opening of the text is an insistent 
shot which, for a full eighteen lengthy seconds, shows us an electric 
bulb gradually switching on, moving from total dark to light. 
 As (the author is right, indeed) we are actually fully miseducated 
to interpret what we see, we tend to take this shot as a somewhat 
stylish way of starting the story, immediately consenting to its prompt 
diegetic justification: it’s the lighting of a cellar, where the wife of the 
main character is going to take a bottle of wine, in order to celebrate a 
special occasion. But if we pay more careful attention, we realize that 
the bulb turning on in the dark can be understood as an occurrence of 
a sign that, just in the beginning of the text, briefly points toward its 
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main topic: this scene opens a film which is going to tell us about how 
we may be able to find out things that at first seem incomprehensible. 
Once started up, the interpretation machine, in this case, works 
really easily, all the more so because, say, both the world of comic 
strips or the one of common speech are full of “bulbs switching on”, 
not to speak, of course, of our ordinary direct experience of a lamp 
which, giving light to a dark space, makes it possible for us to find out 
what just a moment before was indiscernible. Therefore, the viewers 
can assign a meaning to that light because they have already seen other 
lights, from life or in drawings, and furthermore they have heard 
people speaking about metaphorical lights that “switched on in their 
minds”, and so on. This means that, if that specific bulb is located 
inside the film, it is nevertheless nothing but a member of a larger class, 
known through different ways. So, we are facing a token of a culturally 
established type: the type “light coming on in the dark”, with its 
meaning “process that conveys a knowledge in an area that was 
previously unclear”. This general model is located not in the film but 
in the cultural system. 
 
 
Where analogies live:  
beyond text-oriented semiotics 
 
So, we understand that there is a fundamental alternative between two 
greatly different modes of conceiving the sign. The first perspective 
assumes that semiotic relations are entities located inside the texts, and 
that therefore texts could be seen as “composed of signs”. As this view 
is not so easy to sustain, text-oriented semiotics (Greimas in the first 
place) often appears as fluctuating between two options. On the one 
hand, we notice a not fully rationalized tendency to laying aside the 
troublesome notion of “sign”, along with the incorrect relegation of 
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signs in the realm of “manifestation”.5 On the other hand, we see the 
actual identification of “signs in the text” as primary constituents of 
the semiotic backbones, especially evident in the analysis of 
Maupassant (Greimas 1976). 
The other perspective, not textual but culture-oriented, is the one I 
call “neoclassical”, specifically conceived for the current sociosemiotic 
line of studies. In this view, we assume (as Saussure) that the level of 
existence for the semiotic relations is the same as the level of cultural 
systems. From this point of view, what sign structures have in the texts 
is a specific application and occurrence. As we can see, this is nothing 
more than a generalization of the well known (in linguistics) 
assumption that words, the morphemes, have their existence in a 
collectively shared system (the langue), having in the sentences their 
specific occurrences. In Peirce’s terms, we could say that it should be 
sufficient to generalize to every kind of sign what the author said 
about symbols (such as in CP 2.249), stating that every sign signifies 
by virtue of a law, on the strength of an association of general ideas, 
hence qualifying as “ general type or law, […] a Legisign”. 
Of course, this way of seeing deeply transforms our approach to 
textuality. Sure, in every semiotic system the specific textual realiza-
tions show inevitable and constitutive variations. In fact, also in the 
case of our example we are able to envisage a broad range of possible 
variants: instead of an electric bulb, we could see the headlights of a 
car, an electric torch, or maybe the rays of a rising sun. These variants 
can turn out to be interesting, and perhaps to be capable of adding 
some color, but they still remain variants that carry a common 
meaning and can therefore substitute each other. Thus, these different 
kinds of light constitute a case of what we call “equi-similarity”, and 
consequently a class of entities capable of expressing the same concept; 
therefore, they set up what we call a “signifier”, culturally linked to a 
given signified. At a theoretical level, we understand now that the 
                                                 
5  See the entry Signe in the Dictionnaire by Greimas and Courtés (1979). 
a 
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signifier is not what we saw in the film, but the cultural entity that 
manifests itself in a specific mode in the film. But the trick is that, as 
we fall into the illusion to see “words” in a sentence, so we believe we 
are seeing icons in a film, or in a painting. As it often happens, we take 
the reflections for the real thing, but it has to be this way in our direct 
experience of texts: the illusion is part of the game. 
Furthermore, the idea that things possess an intrinsic identity, so 
that their classification is objectively achieved, is a part of the same 
illusion. On the other hand, an act of classification is subjective and 
creative. As Nelson Goodman (1968: 32) states, a classification 
involves choices, so that, he says, the making of a picture is someway a 
manner of making the object which is pictured. If you want to know 
how Shyamalan develops the idea that we found at the very beginning 
of the film, well his central point is just that we tend to refer 
everything we see back to already known categories, a way of behaving 
which could stop any inventiveness and any discovery. We have to be 
open to what can surprise us, be willing to attach importance to 
relevant differences, and so be ready to reorganize our knowledge. As 
we see in the film, we can learn a lot from other people and their 
different ways of viewing. Therefore, we should bear in mind that 
classifications are temporary and relative, negotiated and inter-
subjective; they can be as much conservative as innovative; it is the 
duty of the arts to show us that there are different ways of categorizing 
the world. 
If we now want to make fully explicit the reason why a light 
switching on in the dark can be seen as a token of a signifier (a 
signifier related to a certain concept), there is no doubt that we are 
facing an association based on analogy: straightforwardly, the dark 
metaphorically expresses the concept of “ignorance”, as the light 
expresses the concept of “knowledge”, so that darkness and ignorance 
on the one hand, and coming of light and opening of knowledge on 
the other hand, constitute two couples of analogs. And here, too, the 
effect of analogy (a culturally constructed analogy, of course) rests on 
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a differential ground: darkness and light take their meaning merely in 
their contrast, better said in the apparatus of differences and 
transformations where one is denied when the other is asserted. 
The relation that, for instance, connects the darkness to ignorance, 
links an entity on the side of the signifier with an entity on the side of 
the signified. This is for us an actual case of a semiotic relation 
established upon an effect of analogy: we may call this type of analogy, 
to have a concise expression, “rel-analogy”. As we saw — and as 
schematized in Fig. 1 — equi-similarity puts together variants 
belonging to the same whole (on the side of the signifier or on the side 
of the signified), and is therefore valid for every type of signs, while the 
rel-analogy is a specific kind of connection between signifier and 
signified, defining a specific type of signs (roughly what tradition calls 
“icons”): signs resting on associative correlations, in the sense that will 
be now better specified. Moreover, unlike equi-similar variants, the 
rel-analogous terms are not reversible: the darkness, which is an entity 
that can be easily manifested (textualized) in a perceivable and 
physical way, stands for an abstract concept as “to not know” or “to 
not understand”. Similarly, we can use a map as standing for the 
configuration of a territory, but there couldn’t be any sense in using a 
territory as standing for a map.6 In general terms, we always see that 
the single case stands for the general type, the part for the whole, and 
so on. What’s involved, then, is not a mere relation of similarity, as this 
connection implies a dissymmetry too, between simple and complex. 
We know very well that a map is useful just because it shows a 
schematization, reduced and simplified. But it is the same for a 
pictorial representation, that is always more essential in comparison 
with the represented scene or person: a reduction where, it has to be 
noted, a quantitative less corresponds to a more of significance and 
                                                 
6  This type of dissymmetry has already been remarked; see Wallis 1973 and 
Sebeok 1976: 128. Göran Sonesson has discussed the question in detail, see Sonesson 
1994, 1998. 
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intelligence. Also in the case of a photograph — which could represent 
here a kind of extreme — we may notice that the image of better 
quality and greater meaning is often the one which performs the more 
severe subtraction in comparison with the scene it depicts.7 
 
 
Concrete manifestations
Set of equi-similar variants
Specific mental contents
Set of equi-similar variants
Signifier
Signified
rel-analogy
 
 
Figure 1. Rel-analogy and equi-similarity. 
 
 
                                                 
7  It is interesting to notice how this is a widespread idea, common also in 
popular handbooks for photography enthusiasts. See for instance: “Making 
camera photographs involves the practice of subtractive thinking. [...] Imagine 
being a sculptor of images who chips away at a monolithic block of reality until 
only what is absolutely necessary remains and then relies on each viewer to fill in 
the missing pieces to complete the meaning” (Hirsch 2008: 34–35). 
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Let the sense happen 
 
So, the iconic elaboration condenses portions of the real, of the imagi-
nary or of the conceivable, offering us a simplified image or, as we may 
also say, a model. This is an essential fact if we want to explain why we 
use forms of analogy in such an insistent and ubiquitous manner. 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the analogical arrangement of 
our representation of the world does not indicate any mental 
simplicity or naivety, but a complex and refined thought. The forms of 
analogical association can reach modes of extreme subtlety and 
ductility, including calculated ways to produce polysemous values, 
which have little to do with the proverbial “constitutive ambiguity of 
the image”. Furthermore, the analogical connections are not restricted 
to “similarities” in a strict sense, but include cases such as the one 
which moves from an allusion to its reference, the modes which 
govern synesthetic connections and formal parallelisms, and so on. 
Analogical correlations may have a figurative nature or, as they say, a 
“plastic” one; they may stick to limited points in the text or rely upon 
features recurring in different parts (something like what Umberto 
Eco calls expressive textures (Eco 1976: 210)). This articulated variety 
of means still remains to be defined and analyzed, in the updated 
viewpoint of a grammar of the forms of analogical expression. 
A very effective type of analogical association (roughly cor-
responding to traditional “synecdoche”) is the one which links the 
single case to the whole it belongs to, a modus operandi common in 
photography, for instance in the field of reportage. This procedure 
allows analogical communication to operate through “scraps”: a form 
of great efficiency, able to thicken semantic values using, in a 
sophisticated manner, both types of analogy we are talking of. Let’s see 
how it works. Schematically, the photographer investigates a given 
situation (a war scenery, an urban area presenting a particular social 
characterization, and so on), trying to understand it, sorting out the 
most relevant aspects, and so developing a mental interpretation — 
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which is, in practice, the meaning he therefore set himself to express. 
In this first phase, then, he is going from the observed world towards a 
constructed meaning. At this point, he will try to define how, 
extracting a scrap, or a facet, from the observed reality, and giving it a 
definite visual arrangement, it is possible to give rise to a proper 
support for the intended communicative performance. Now he is 
going from the side of the signified to the side of the signifier, indeed: 
so that the superficial “reference” of the image to the “real” is a mere 
appearance, if not a deceptive effect. 
It should be noted at this point how the legitimacy of this gesture 
of cutting out a fragment from the whole rests on the assumption that 
the portion of reality specifically caught in the photograph is not 
anomalous or uncharacteristic, since in such a case it could be seen as 
a deception. In principle, what is cut out should be comparable to 
other portions (in our terms, be “equi-similar” to them), and 
ultimately equivalent to the whole — what in current speech we call 
“to be representative”. Both in the relation part-to-part as in the 
relation part-to-whole, we see in action forms of equi-similarity that 
are far from being either simple or obvious. I mean that the author 
makes us understand that the photograph he produced could be 
semiotically equivalent to other photographs that, in the same place, 
he or someone else could have produced, as variants of a structured 
signifier that brings us a given concept (the intolerable cruelty of war, 
for instance). 
Perhaps, considering the example of the electric bulb, you could 
have thought that our theoretical model could apply only to images 
working as symbols or metaphors, but not to images more bound to a 
“real” starting point, like in the realm of journalism. But, if we give it a 
more serious attention, in the case of reporting, too, the making of 
every image departs from a meaning that has to be expressed. Sure, to 
the exclusion of instances where strictly, and maybe almost compul-
sory, someone set oneself “not to say anything”. But of course, if there 
is an image fully devoid of any meaning, a mere impersonal replica of 
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an object, it should be considered as not pertaining to the semiotic 
domain. 
Be they symbolic images or photographic reportages, visual 
portraits or grasps of some magic landscape, the analogical representa-
tions obey in any case the theoretical model that we tried to propose, 
with the aim of recovering an effective and brighter way to explain 
semiotic processes. “Processes”, it should be emphasized. Let us see 
why. If we go back to our reporter, we realize that what he presents is 
not just an “image of something”. Now, this is the point: the very 
meaning of his “to be there”, together with his way of looking and 
comprehending, selecting and framing, bounding and arranging, and 
his capability in processing things so as to make visible what hardly 
should be seen by a direct look, and finally his way of giving assurance 
about representativeness and equivalence… this whole sequence of 
steps and procedures, pacts and guarantees, all that, truly, is engraved 
in the image he is showing us, all that is exposed and presented as a 
part of the apparatus that ultimately sets up its meaning.  
We perceive the reasons of his clipping, the logic of his choices, his 
search for that specific perspective, and so on. As John Berger pointed 
out, every time we look at a photograph, we are aware of the 
photographer selecting that sight; photographic images do not show 
things, but relations between things and observers (Berger 1972: 9–10). 
Not far from here are the words by Philippe Dubois (1983: 9): “avec la 
photographie, il ne nous est plus possible de penser l’image en dehors de 
l’acte qui la fait être”8. Most images, as again John Berger (1995) said 
about photographs, look as quotations of reality; but it should be 
added that they are mainly pointing out just the ideal marks indicating 
the quotation. Under any creation of an analogical reference, peeps 
out a smouldering metasemiotic dimension (“Look: this is a way 
someone made this image…”). 
                                                 
8  “dealing with photographs, we cannot any more consider the images outside 
the action that creates them” 
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Here is one of the most remarkable differences between index and 
icon. While both seem to have a story to tell, nevertheless the index 
often pretends innocence and unintentionality, as if it was the footstep 
left behind by a mechanical device. The analogical sign tends instead to 
emphasize that it is intentionally made, showing off its process of 
construction and the manners (the rules) of its specific practice of 
production. We cannot understand unless we mentally repeat its course; 
we cannot discover its meaning unless we make its sense happen. 
 
 
Making the world thinkable and the ideas visible 
 
This brings us to a last, crucial consideration. Let us go back to our 
example of the electric bulb switching on, in the incipit of the Sixth 
Sense. We gave to those images a perhaps convincing reading, but 
could they have more, different readings? Let us say that, looking to 
this black screen gradually brightening, we can definitely see an 
allusion to the very same process of the film projection: an assumption 
sustained by many subsequent mentions to the power of recorded 
images, or sounds, and by the amazingly symmetrical finale, where the 
image vanishes in a fully white light (as the protagonist — thanks also 
to another film showing inside the film — eventually realizes the 
unreachable and terrible truth). 
Then, could we say if the “right interpretation” is the one 
mentioned before (Topic: how we can understand the world), or the 
one suggested now (Topic: how cinema creates a representation of 
life)? Or perhaps the first one is a partial and provisional reading, and 
the latter brings us to the ultimate meaning? We could instead assume 
that crucial is just the way the analogical references stratify in parallel: 
this film talks about how knowledge arises, but cinema is in its own a 
vehicle of knowledge; the deepest meaning is in the concurrence of 
different levels: light equals knowledge, light equals cinema, then 
cinema equals knowledge… 
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If we take this path, we could also notice that the same story shows 
us how can we understand who we really are only passing through the 
eyes of someone else; but, again, cinema is not just a means to see with 
someone else’s eyes? Looking elsewhere, in a different way, not quite 
being who we are, not exactly from here where we are… Actually, if 
you saw the film, you remember how the protagonist first reaches a 
fragment of the truth. He listens to a tape recording (very similar to an 
exposed film, isn’t it?), but selecting just an “insignificant” fraction 
that he had never listen to, because there was “nothing” there, only 
“silence”, as he was not there at the moment of recording. Looking 
elsewhere, not through our eyes, listening into the silence of our 
absence, finding the truth where we are sure there is no meaning, 
learning from the voices of missing people… or — it is another key 
episode in the film — discovering a murderer from the void, useless 
section of a video tape: multiple parallel and equi-similar segments 
(and we could easily add more of them). Which one “is the meaning”, 
and which one is the mere vehicle of that meaning? We feel that the 
authentic meaning is not lying in a specific level, but in the same 
outline of their correspondence, and we could not tell the “authentic 
meaning”, if not making use of another metaphorical vehicle: for 
instance, recognizing that knowledge is not merely “a light”, but a light 
at the moment it is breaking the darkness, like a divergent, anomalous 
presence where its absence is rule. The meaning of all those episodes 
may be clear to our mind, but it does not reside somewhere in a 
specific level: it exists only in the analogy that intersects them all. But 
perhaps this could bring us to the best definition for the concept of 
“signified” in the case of a complex iconic sign: signified is the shared 
abstract logic that underlies all the different expressive variants, as a 
common conceptual form. 
There is a theory about it, incomplete but fascinating, as this way of 
working of semiotic systems with an analogical basis has been studied 
in depth by Claude Lévi-Strauss, mainly in his books about American 
native mythologies. He lead us to think that such systems do not 
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actually outline a final semantic plane, as their primary semantic value 
should better be seen in the same logical form through which they 
induce us to a certain way of reading the world, thanks to the logic of 
parallelisms they set up for us. With Lévi-Strauss’ words, we could say 
that the meaning “is not in a privileged content, but in logical relations 
devoid of content” (Lévi-Strauss 1964: 246). I would be less extreme, 
but I think that analogies should be seen as more than a straight-
forward device to establish semiotic references: the cultural design that 
shapes the analogies we are lead to perceive, holds the order which 
rules our whole experience. 
So, the general model of sign we talked about helps us to 
understand how iconic signs tend to make us perceive classes and 
crossings of analogical equivalence. While the usual model of icon 
considers it as a link between “this thing” and “that other thing” at a 
local and specific level, the actual outcome of analogical configurations 
seems to mainly move in a quite different direction. Even in the case of 
a photograph shot by a reporter in a definite place and situation, we 
are inclined to feel that, say, this child in the image had been put under 
our eyes not for what he personally is, but because he is similar to 
many other children, tormented in that war, a war whose cruelty is 
similar to the cruelty of any other war, and similar also to the cruelty 
of many other circumstances where violence overwhelms the innocent. 
A bitter truth, made visible in the face of this child, here and now. Our 
closing hypothesis is therefore that we use icons not just because of 
their aptitude to describe something but, more often than not, because 
of their powerful faculty of generalizing, categorizing, connecting, and 
so reassuring us that sense is not only thinkable in our mind but visible 
everywhere, widespread and truly present in the world: images do not 
show things, but thoughts. 
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Ассоциации, основанные на аналогии, в рамке 
«неоклассической» семиотической теории 
 
Много времени прошло с тех пор, как Чарльзом Пирсом было пред-
ложено понятие иконических знаков. Но чем шире становится поле 
обозначения на основе аналогии, тем более очевидным становится 
то, что концепция простой логической связи физического объекта с 
другим объектом или ментальным энтитетом недостаточна. С другой 
стороны, существует созданная Фердинандом де Соссюром более 
рафинированная теория знака, но она по существу направлена на 
более ограниченную область и не учитывает знаков, основанных на 
аналогии. 
 В статье показано, каким образом, исходя из теории Соссюра и 
ставя своей целью рассмотреть  и знаки, основанные на аналогии, 
можно переформулировать теорию знаков. В итоге можно говорить 
о «неоклассической» инновационной семиотической теории, кото-
рая способна соединить в себе более поздний «социосемиотический» 
подход с основами нашей дисциплины. 
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Analoogiapõhised assotsiatsioonid „neoklassikalise” 
semiootikateooria raamistus 
 
Sellest kui C. S. Peirce pakkus välja ikooniliste märkide mõiste, on möö-
dunud palju aega. Sealt peale oleme üha enam mõistnud, et semiootilised 
süsteemid põhinevad eelkõige mingit tüüpi sarnasusel. Ent mida enam me 
näeme analoogiapõhise tähistuse välja kasvavat, seda enam saame me 
teadlikuks sellest, kui ebapiisav on arusaam lihtsast suhtest, mis ühendab 
loogiliselt füüsilist objekti teise objektiga või mentaalse entiteediga. Teisalt 
eksisteerib Ferdinand de Saussure’i poolt loodud rafineeritum märgi-
teooria, aga see teooria on oma olemuselt suunatud piiratud ainevallale 
ning ei hõlma neid märke, mis põhinevad analoogiapõhistel assotsiat-
sioonidel. 
 Käesoleva artikli peamine eesmärk on näidata, kuidas Saussure’i teoo-
ria edasiarendus, mille esmane eesmärk on hõlmata ka analoogial põhi-
nevaid märke, võib pakkuda võimaluse märgiteooria ümberformulee-
rimiseks. Nii võime me rääkida „neoklassikalisest” innovatiivsest 
semiootikateooriast, mis on suuteline endas ühendama hilisema „sotsio-
semiootilise” lähenemise meie distsipliini oluliste põhialustega. 
 
 
